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Abstract
With the launch of Barack Obama’s strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific, there has been a
widening of the United States’ military, economic, and diplomatic presence in the
Southeast Asian region. Likewise, it is clear that Southeast Asia is currently a region of
relevant interest for both the United States and the European Union (EU). Surprisingly,
however, up to the present, a systematic comparison of their approaches in the region
has been largely lacking. To fill this void, this article compares US and EU interests,
strategies, and main instruments of cooperation in Southeast Asia. Special attention is
paid to the main developments that occurred in the United States, from Obama’s
announcement of a strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific to Donald Trump’s National
Security Strategy, and in the EU, with the release there of the 2012 “Updated East Asia
Policy Guidelines.” Examining whether the EU and the United States are moving towards
a greater convergence of intent is of crucial importance for identifying opportunities for
the further development of the transatlantic relationship in Southeast Asia. This article
argues, though, that despite some apparent common traits in the US’s and the EU’s
intentions, their strategies and instruments ultimately differ substantially – reflecting
divergent paths. This creates crucial impediments to any further development of
transatlantic cooperation in Southeast Asia.
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Introduction
With the launch of Barack Obama’s strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific, there has been a
widening of the United States’ military, economic, and diplomatic presence in the
Southeast Asian region – and, in particular, more extensive engagement with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Likewise, the year 2012 saw an
intensification of European Union (EU)–ASEAN relations, testified to inter alia by the
unprecedented number of official visits from EU officials to ASEAN. These included
the first official visit to the ASEAN Secretariat by the then high representative (HR) of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Ashton, by EU accession to the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and by new commitments in the realm of non-
traditional security (NTS).
These developments have attracted increasing attention in academic circles and
think tanks. Much has been written about US rebalancing policy in Southeast Asia
(see e.g. Graham, 2013; Limaye, 2013) and about the EU’s evolving partnerships with
the region (Kennes, 2015; Pennisi di Floristella, 2017). At first glance, the United
States and the EU appear to have followed parallel approaches. Both actors have
acceded to the TAC, which can still be considered the most prominent Southeast
Asian security framework, and both have established a diplomatic mission to ASEAN
and have appointed a dedicated ambassador. They have committed to a rules-based
approach, respect for international law and the peaceful solution of disputes, liberal
democracy, and trade and economic interdependence. Both have embarked on new
initiatives to tackle transnational security challenges and have emphasised the cen-
trality of regional institutions – above all ASEAN. Furthermore, the United States and
the EU have launched regional strategic partnerships. In November 2015, the White
House released a “Joint Statement on the ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership.” In a
similar manner, the European Parliament and the European Council initiated a joint
communication called “The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic
Purpose.”
Yet the advent of the new US president, Donald Trump, in 2017 would leave lingering
questions about the US’s role in the region. Southeast Asia had not figured in Trump’s
presidential campaign, and local partners have become increasingly worried that under
the “America First” motto the United States might abandon its support for multi-lateral
institutions and regional diplomacy. At the same time, EU long-term commitment to
Southeast Asia has also been increasingly constrained by daunting challenges coming
from both within EU borders and its immediate neighbourhood – notably, Brexit, the
migration and Eurozone crises, as well as limited available resources in qualitative and
quantitative terms. It is clear, though, that Southeast Asia is currently a region of interest
for both the EU and the United States despite their different historic, economic, and
diplomatic ties with it.
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Surprisingly, however, up to the present, the existing literature has not engaged in a
systematic comparison of EU and US approaches to Southeast Asia. Examining whether
their approaches are moving towards a greater convergence is of crucial importance for
identifying opportunities for the further development of the transatlantic relationship in
Southeast Asia, through co-operation and the division of labour. To fill this void, and
utilising some commonly employed tools of foreign policy analysis, this article aims at
comparing US and EU interests, strategies, and main instruments of cooperation in
Southeast Asia, drawing on both primary sources, such as official documents and policy
papers, and secondary literature.
The focus of this article is on the main developments which occurred in the United
States, from Obama’s announcement of a strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific to Trump’s
National Security Strategy (NSS), and in the EU, with the release there of the 2012
updated “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia.” Through this
analysis, the article addresses the following key questions: What are the similarities and
differences in EU and US approaches to ASEAN? To what extent are the US and the EU
growing closer or more distant? And, is there any prospect of transatlantic cooperation in
the region occurring? The following comparison of US and EU approaches to the region
demonstrates, however, that despite some apparent common traits – ones which emerged
especially during the Obama administration – their regional strategies and instruments
ultimately differ substantially – reflecting divergent paths. This creates crucial impe-
diments to any further development of transatlantic cooperation in this region.
US Interests
US interests in Southeast Asia have been remarkably consistent since the end of the Cold
War. As Capie (2018) points out, Obama’s rebalancing strategy can be seen as an
expansion rather than a transformation of US policy in the region. Official US speeches
and documents outline, in fact, a commitment to long-standing US interests: namely,
stability and security as well as a regional order rooted in an open and transparent
economic environment; the peaceful resolution of disputes; respect for universal values,
human rights, and freedoms; and a rules-based international order (Clinton, 2011; The
White House, 2015; US Department of Defense, 2012, 2014).
Maintaining peace and security across the region has been a long-standing US interest
in Southeast Asia. As noted by Schambaugh (2013), preserving Southeast Asian stability
functions to enhance the US’s economic and diplomatic standing in the region and to
prevent the emergence of a rival superpower there. Accordingly, during the Cold War
era, the United States heavily invested in the region to prevent the expansion of com-
munism and to hold Southeast Asia within the Western sphere of influence. Since the
1990s, meanwhile, Southeast Asia has become one of the centres of US efforts to contain
China’s rise and to limit its assertive approach vis-a`-vis US allies in various domains –
including around the question of contested territorial claims in the South China Sea
(SCS).
Against this backdrop, the regional Southeast Asian grouping ASEAN has progres-
sively acquired growing relevance for the United States. While the ASEAN-US
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Dialogue begun in 1977 with a clear focus on economics, trade, and development, since
early in the new century co-operation has rapidly grown to include a wide range of
political security and sociocultural areas (Chahavalpongpun, 2012). ASEAN and the
United States have engaged in regular dialogue on regional and global concerns via a
number of institutional settings such as the ASEAN-US Summit, the Post Ministerial
Conferences, the ASEAN-US Dialogue, and the Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting.
Since November 2009, ASEAN and US leaders have also met on an annual basis on the
sidelines of the ASEAN Summit.
In this fashion, ASEAN has become a crucial partner for the United States in
Southeast Asia, while there has been a growing interest on the part of the latter in
enhancing ASEAN-US ties and in supporting ASEAN centrality. Indeed, ASEAN’s
framework for regional cooperation – fostered by the cultivation of dialogue, the pro-
motion of trust and confidence among states, and the facilitation of mutual understanding
– has supported the US’s own interests in maintaining peace and stability in the region. It
has, indeed, been widely acknowledged that ASEAN’s ability to advocate and diffuse
norms for regional governance across the region have, alongside its efforts to offer rules-
based solutions, helped to make transactions more predictable and to defuse conflicts
(Allison, 2017; Ba, 2010). Of no less importance, ASEAN’s central role as a convener
and builder of multi-lateral regional institutions in Asia-Pacific and its ability to bring
together all the major and regional powers within multi-lateral consultative frameworks
– like the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN
Defense Ministers Plus (ADMM Plus) – has warded off the potential for Chinese
dominance or hegemony (Caballero Anthony, 2014). The ASEAN-led multi-lateral
architecture has acted, in fact, as a restraint on China’s increasing attempts to pull
Southeast Asian states away from the West by pressuring them to adopt more distinctive
Asian values (Tow, 2012).
That said, the other key interest of the United States in Southeast Asia is to support
trade and economic liberalisation. The White House recognises Southeast Asia’s eco-
nomic centrality given that:
Collectively, the ten member states of ASEAN comprise the third-largest economy in Asia
and the seventh-largest in the world, with a combined GDP of US$ 2.4 trillion. (The White
House, 2016)
This robust performance combined with a population of nearly 635 million people as
of 2016 makes Southeast Asia an attractive destination for US trade and investment. The
region indeed has a vast consumer base, globally behind only China and India. In
addition to this, ASEAN as a regional group offers more attractive markets and efficient
locations for US investments (Petri and Plummer, 2014). In 2016, the United States was
ASEAN’s third biggest destination for exports following ASEAN members and China.
Meanwhile, the United States ranked fifth as the place of origin for imported goods after
ASEAN, China, Japan, and the EU (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a). In 2016, two-way trade
between the United States and ASEAN reached USD 230 billion, having grown by more
than 58 per cent since 2010 (Ghosh, 2018). In parallel, US foreign direct investment
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(FDI) in ASEAN has almost doubled since 2008. FDI from ASEAN to the United States
stood at USD 24.2 billion in 2014 (Nguyen, 2016). Of no less significance, it has been
estimated that US exports to ASEAN (worth over USD 100 billion) support 550,000 jobs
for American workers and that many US companies – including many of the leading US
multi-national corporations – have a presence in ASEAN (Kow, 2018).
Finally, the United States has an interest in promoting a rules-based internal order and
universal values – including human rights and liberal democracy. In particular since
2009, with the escalation of the SCS dispute, the United States has insisted that it has
“important national interests” (Capie, 2018) in respect of international norms and rules,
the preservation of freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful resolution of
this dispute. The Strait of Malacca is indeed a crucial shipping lane for the United States,
being the second-largest choke point in the world after the Strait of Hormuz for the oil
trade. Meanwhile, the United States has also partnered with ASEAN and with civil
society groups in Southeast Asia to promote openness and good governance, strengthen
the rule of law, and to build accountable institutions – including by helping ASEAN
human rights bodies to integrate international standards into legislative and judicial
processes.
Generally speaking, the advent of Trump has not signalled a deviation in core US
interests in the region. However, one might reasonably argue that economic- and
security-related concerns have prevailed over other objectives. As indicated by “The
Remarks by President Trump on his Trip to Asia,” US interests now have to be read
through the lens of an “America First” approach intended to “rebuild America, restore its
economic strength, and defend its national security” (The White House, 2017a). Along
these lines, the current president has insisted on strengthening ties with US allies,
containing China’s power projection, and defusing the North Korea nuclear issue. He has
also promoted the need to reshape regional economic trade and rules, prioritising US
interests over those of its allies – marking the advent of a more transactional, defensive,
and bilaterally focused approach. Some (Kurlantzick, 2017; Sutter, 2017) also warn that
the current Trump administration is devoting secondary attention to democracy pro-
motion and universal human rights. If, in fact, Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
(FOIP) idea is supposed to be based on the US prioritising democracy and human rights
as core interests even though democracy assistance budgets have remained the same,
then high-level policy has begun to undermine American democratic programmes
(Carothers and Brown, 2018). For example, Trump barely mentioned human rights
abuses in the Philippines when he met President Rodrigo Duterte in 2017, and, unlike his
predecessors, he has not publicly condemned them either. Conversely, the White House
has continued to boost ties with many of Asia’s authoritarian or semi-authoritarian
regimes – including Duterte, the generals who run the Kingdom of Thailand, and
Malaysian prime minister Najib tun Razak (Kurlantzick, 2017).
Consequently, Trump’s praise of dictators abroad has not assuaged concerns over
diminishing US interests in democracy and human rights promotion in the region
(Parameswaran, 2019). Nevertheless, in December 2018, the adoption of the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) – which includes new funding to promote democracy,
civil society, the rule of law, and human rights, occurring in tandem with other initiatives
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to promote good governance – suggests some continuity of US policy in this realm.
Likewise, the two High-Level Ministerial Meetings held by the US State Department
designed to advance religious freedom – coming in the wake of concerns about human
rights violations, including abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya Muslim minority in
Myanmar – indicate that attention to democracy and human rights has not been com-
pletely cast aside.
EU Interests
The EU’s increasing gravitation towards Southeast Asia dates back to 1972, when an
informal dialogue began between the then European Community (EC) and ASEAN,
paving the way for one of the oldest group-to-group relationships worldwide. Economic
and trade cooperation, aimed at achieving greater market access for ASEAN’s exports
and a price stabilisation scheme for its primary commodities, provided the initial impetus
for the advancing of relations between these two regional groupings (Yeo, 2010).
Meanwhile, the robust economic performance of the ASEAN bloc, the dynamism of the
export-led economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand which have
recently been followed by the Philippines and Vietnam too, led the EU to prioritise trade,
investment links, and market opportunities (Yeo, 2010). Importantly, in 1980, the
ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement was the first interregional one that the EC would
sign with a foreign regional group. It had, therefore, a highly symbolic value, as it
contributed to consolidating the image of Europe as a civilian power and served to
legitimise ASEAN’s regional role as well (Camroux, 2008).
Since the inception of its relations with Southeast Asia, the EU’s key strategic interest
has been economic. In this regard, the data are telling. ASEAN as a whole is the EU’s
third-largest trading partner outside Europe, after the United States and China; the EU,
meanwhile, is ASEAN’s second-largest trade partner after China. In 2017, ASEAN
exported almost EUR 135 billion worth of goods to the EU while the latter exported EUR
91 billion to the former (EEAS, 2018). Meanwhile, the EU is the biggest provider of FDI
to ASEAN with an investment portfolio of over EUR 263 billion (EEAS, 2018).
From a political point of view, the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia acquired
greater significance with the launch of the first ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting
(AEMM) in 1978. Over the years, a comprehensive dialogue structure has developed,
with the biennial AEMM as the highest forum, alongside the ASEAN-EU Post Minis-
terial Conference, ASEAN-EU Senior Officials meetings, and the ASEAN-EU Joint
Cooperation Committee. These regular meetings have helped ASEAN and the EU better
understand one another and build a higher level of familiarity to further cooperation.
In the 1990s, the EU also started to engage with Southeast Asia in security matters in
the context of the ARF, which is Asia’s first region-wide security institution that brings
together ASEAN member states, major powers (United States, China, Japan, and Rus-
sia), and the EU. Since its foundation in 1994, the ARF has provided a regular forum for
dialogue to contribute to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy
in Asia-Pacific. However, the EU’s support of peace and stability as well as promotion of
the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and peace-oriented values –as espoused
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in the principles of the “ASEANWay” and in ASEAN’s adherence to non-interference –
have been relevant sticking points and sources of friction, especially around the
Myanmar issue. Notably, that country’s deplorable human rights record, disagreement
on how to best engage with it, and its admission as a new member of ASEAN in 1997 –
which was strongly opposed by the EU – long hampered ASEAN–EU interregional
cooperation.
It was only in the aftermath of 9/11 and the resulting worldwide securitisation trends
that the EU manifested a clear related interest in Southeast Asia. Among others, the 2001
Commission Communication “A New Partnership in Southeast Asia” highlights the
EU’s interest in supporting the peace, stability, and territorial integrity of Southeast
Asian countries, conflict prevention, and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Since
then, a number of other official documents have highlighted the EU’s interest in forging
closer cooperation in NTS arenas, including food and maritime security as well as cli-
mate change. The SCS dispute also underlines the EU’s increasing interest in the
region’s security situation. While the EU has not taken any position on claims to terri-
tories and maritime spaces in the SCS, both the EU and its individual member states have
committed to safeguarding peace and the unimpeded flow of trade and communication
across these waters and to pursuing them in accordance with international law. This
includes regarding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and
its arbitration procedures, not least because approximately one-third of EU trade passes
through these waters. The more recent 2012 Guidelines state in fact:
The recent increase in tensions in the SCS, with conflicting claims involving several
countries in the region, could if unchecked have implications for navigation and commerce
across the broader region, including for EU trade and investment interests. (Council of the
European Union, 2012)
Finally, the EU has placed multi-lateral dialogue in the ASEAN region as a whole as
among its key strategic interests. Notably, ASEAN has been considered as the “key to
developing a more rounded Asia strategy” and is regarded as the leading multi-lateral
mechanism of dialogue and cooperation on political, security, and economic issues in
Southeast Asia (Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council,
2015).
US Strategy under Obama
Under the Obama administration (2009–2017), Asia was elevated to a top priority of US
strategy. While the United States since the end of the VietnamWar had only sporadically
engaged with Southeast Asia, Obama regarded himself as the first “Pacific president”
and attempted to bring together several important shifts in US strategy – including the
winding-down of costly interventions in the Middle East, greater attention to Asia, and in
particular focus on Southeast Asia. In October 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s article “America’s Pacific Century” and, one month later, “Obama’s Remarks
to the Australian Parliament” marked the birth of the pivot to Asia.
178 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38(2)
The secretary of state clearly announced a strategic turn to Asia-Pacific through
increased diplomatic, economic, and strategic investments. She also outlined
six key lines of action, namely: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our
working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional
multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military
presence; and advancing democracy and human rights. (Clinton, 2011: 57)
Soon after, Obama defined “the presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top
priority” and highlighted three critical components of US strategy towards the region:
namely, “to advance security, prosperity, and human dignity” (The White House, 2011).
Generally speaking, Obama’s rebalancing strategy had a significant Southeast Asian
dimension throughout his two terms. While the strategy was rearticulated during
Obama’s second term, it maintained the main overarching themes the president had
initially presented – that is to say, emphasis on alliances and partnerships, trade and
economics, and diplomacy and multi-lateralism.
The security and military dimensions were key components of Obama’s strategy in
Southeast Asia. Since his speech of 2011, the president emphasised that the US position
on defence needed to evolve in ways that would create a more broadly distributed,
flexible, and sustainable presence in the region, with him identifying the need for the
enhancement of US forces in Southeast Asia (Tow, 2016). For this aim, the Pentagon
endorsed the Defense Strategic Guidance and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
announced that the United States would keep 60 per cent of its naval assets in Asia. In
addition to this, the United States tried to build up the forces of its allies and to forge new
partnerships. In April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allowed the United States access to
five military bases in the Philippines and permission to rotate troops via that country.
In 2015, the United States announced the Maritime Security Initiative aimed at
providing assistance to countries so as to improve their maritime awareness. The United
States has also sought to normalise and strengthen bilateral ties with Vietnam, which
culminated in a Comprehensive Partnership in 2013. Of no less significance, the United
States tried to re-engage Singapore. The 2015 EDCA permitted the deployment of US
aircraft and ships to Singapore on a rotational basis for various regional maritime patrol
activities. The United States also stepped up co-operation with Indonesia, with the 2010
Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. The rebalance also included efforts to reach out
to countries with which the United States had poor relations in the past, such as Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Obama’s first-ever visits to Myanmar and Cambodia and
Clinton’s visit to Laos epitomised the policy of cooperating with countries with which
the United States had either not been engaged or had been under-engaged for nearly a
generation (Limaye, 2013). Of no less significance, Obama’s strategy championed a
broader security notion, paying attention to NTS challenges – from climate change to
human trafficking. Thus, issues ranging from global health, sustainable development,
cybersecurity, and countering violent extremism were treated as important areas of
cooperation.
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The second key pillar of Obama’s strategy in Southeast Asia was economic. In this
realm, the Obama administration inaugurated the Expanded Economic Engagement
Initiative (E3), a framework for economic cooperation designed to expand trade and
investment ties between the US and ASEAN and to increase the efficiency of supply
chains. In addition, Obama launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade initiative,
which was considered a central pillar of the US rebalancing strategy – designed to
counter China’s growing economic influence in Southeast Asia. Signed in February
2016, the TPP was a free trade agreement (FTA) with four small ASEAN countries
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam) that mandated the liberalisation of trade but
also demanded that participants respect labour and environmental standards as well as
intellectual property rights and foreign investment protection. Although TPP only
included four ASEAN countries, the United States launched a programme to assist other
regional states in their understanding of its key tenets.
Finally, the third pillar of the rebalancing strategy was growing multi-lateral
engagement, in particular with ASEAN. This multi-lateral attitude was signalled, inter
alia, by the high number of visits by US leaders and high-ranking diplomats. In 2009,
during his first year in office, Obama arranged the first summit with all ten ASEAN
members. In 2010, Washington joined the ADMM Plus, a platform for ASEAN and its
Dialogue Partners to strengthen security and defence cooperation in the region. In 2011,
Obama became the first US president to attend the EAS, a forum founded in 2005 which
brought together all the key Asian powers – plus the United States and Russia too (since
2011). Meanwhile, the first resident ambassador of the United States to the ASEAN
Secretariat, David Lee Carden, was also appointed. In 2012, the ASEAN-US Summit
was institutionalised and, in 2015, the US-ASEAN relationship was elevated to a stra-
tegic partnership. This demonstrated US commitment to a multi-dimensional and
comprehensive relationship with ASEAN, focusing on efforts to promote a rules-based
order in Asia-Pacific, as well as democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and
universal human rights. In 2016, the historic Sunnylands Summit was indicative of
ASEAN’s ascending centrality for the United States and of the importance of multi-
lateralism in US foreign policy under Obama. US accession to the TAC was also a very
significant “symbolic move to engage more deeply and effectively with Southeast Asia
and to cooperate with the ASEAN countries on the regional multi-lateral processes”
(Nguyen, 2016: 45), not least because the United States had to accept a normative
security framework entirely defined by a group of small and militarily weak countries –
which would have constrained the US’s ability to renounce the use of force in settling
disputes (Caballero Anthony, 2018).
Trump’s National Security Strategy
While Obama’s strategy attached high priority to Southeast Asia, the Trump adminis-
tration has announced an end to that pivot to Asia; also, Southeast Asia was rarely
mentioned during the presidential campaign in 2015 and 2016. The Trump adminis-
tration was also rather slow in nominating appointees to the region. This apparent neglect
changed in April 2017 with Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to Indonesia and, more
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importantly, with Trump’s twelve-day tour of Asia in November of the same year, which
reaffirmed continued US involvement in Southeast Asian affairs.
More importantly, in December 2017, the Trump administration delivered an NSS.
The document indicates that Trump’s approach to Southeast Asia is conceived of within
a new regional framing, the “Indo-Pacific region,” defined as “the region, which stret-
ches from the West coast of India to the Western shores of the US” (The White House,
2017b). Significantly, by referring to the Indo-Pacific region at the top of the section
devoted to the discussion of the US approach to different world regions, Trump showed a
certain degree of continuity with the Obama administration – implicitly considering the
Indo-Pacific as the strategically most important geographical area for US foreign policy.
Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific framing attaches an important focus on the maritime
domain – specifically, on sea lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Searight,
2017). This suggests another line of continuity with the Obama administration, which
also focused on creating stronger ties with India. Other aspects, such as an emphasis on
the importance of traditional alliances as well as on the construction of new economic
and security partnerships, are testament that, to some extent, Trump’s strategy has not
discarded the core themes of Obama’s policy in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, in contrast to his predecessor who had balanced concerns about China’s
rise with a cooperative attitude, the diplomatic narrative vis-a`-vis that country has now
been abandoned in favour of more adversarial tones. The People’s Republic of China is
defined, indeed, as one of the bigger existential threats to the US whose dominance,
aggressive investments, and other economic activities “risk diminishing the sovereignty
of many countries in the Indo-Pacific” (The White House, 2017b). On a number of
occasions, Trump has identified China as a strategic competitor responsible for “chronic
trade abuses” (The White House, 2017c). Pence also reiterated the criticism of China,
accusing the latter of
employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools,
as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.
(2018: 1)
In this regard, despite the fact that Southeast Asian states may share concerns over
China’s activities in the SCS and unfair trade practices, they are increasingly preoccu-
pied that the US’s new strategy could inflame tensions and force them to choose between
Washington and Beijing (Chandran, 2018).
Security and defence cooperation have become the other key focuses of Trump’s
strategy in Southeast Asia. According to the current administration, in 2018, the United
States provided more than half a billion dollars in security assistance to Indo-Pacific
nations – more than double the previous year (The White House, 2018). A recent
statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reaffirmed that “security has been a major
focus of conversations within the region” (US Department of State, 2018). Washington
has also expressed its willingness to work more closely with ASEAN, and that the latter
will remain at the centre of efforts to tackle critical security issues in the Indo-Pacific
(US Department of State, 2018). On this point, it is worth noting that the NSS is not
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framed as a comprehensive approach. Defence and terrorism figure among top-priority
policy areas for the United States, while other NTS concerns – above all climate change
– have been left aside. In the same vein, the speech by Secretary of Defense James N.
Mattis at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018 detailed the FOIP strategy as having four key
aspects: maritime issues, interoperability and building networks of allies and partners,
the rule of law, and economic development led by the private sector. The speech was
noteworthy for its strong emphasis on rising security concerns regarding China’s mar-
itime ambitions in the SCS.
Another novelty of the current US strategy towards Southeast Asia is that it seems
only partially to be guided by a multi-lateral commitment. In the economic realm, while
Obama viewed the multi-lateral TPP as one essential component of the pivot’s policy,
Trump withdrew from this partnership – considering it more beneficial for the United
States to promote bilateral FTAs. Moreover, rather than seeking to raise openness across
the region, Trump has reproached countries with which the United States has a trade
deficit. The US approach towards regional institutions is also ambivalent and as of yet
unclear. On the one hand, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN are
mentioned as centrepieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and identified as
the main platforms for promoting an order based on freedom (The White House, 2017b).
Yet, on the other hand, since the APEC meeting in Da Nang (2017), Trump has stated
his preference for bilateral trade agreements with Indo-Pacific nations. Trump has also
shown disdain for the growing dysfunctionality of ASEAN (Searight, 2018). The new
emphasis on India and the resurrection of cooperation within the so-called Quad
(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: namely, India, Australia, Japan, and the United States)
has also been perceived as a challenge to ASEAN centrality. There are also concerns that
Trump might selectively employ multi-lateral forums to pursue his own agenda, for
example, in areas such as counterterrorism or maritime security (Parameswaran, 2016).
It is also not to be forgotten that while Trump attended both the ASEAN and APEC
meetings in 2017, 2018 saw a dramatic downturn in US presidential engagement with
SoutheastAsia –with Trump’s absence from theASEANSummit in Singapore, skipping of
the EAS, and non-hosting of any Southeast Asian leaders in the United States. The recent
adoption of the ARIA, which complements the US’s NSS, might possibly pave the way for
newmoves inTrump’s strategy towardsSoutheastAsia.ARIAaims, in fact, at establishing a
multi-faced US strategy to increase US security, economic interests, and values in the Indo-
Pacific region. In particular, though maintaining a strong security focus, the act urges a
comprehensive economic engagement framework with ASEAN and with states that it is in
the national security interests of the United States to promote human rights and respect for
democratic values within the Indo-Pacific region. It remains to be seen whether the
announced initiative will materialise in specific policies for Southeast Asia.
EU Strategy
Generally speaking, the EU’s strategy for Southeast Asia is centred on a multi-pronged
approach that combines a preference for multi-lateralism with bilateralism; a commit-
ment to a comprehensive approach; and the promotion of the rule of law, democracy,
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human rights, and development assistance. Multi-lateralism is one of the key aims of the
EU. In particular, ASEAN is considered as the natural counterpart of the EU and as a
“key to developing a more rounded Asia strategy” and “at the heart of the efforts to build
a more robust regional security order in the wider Asia-Pacific” (Joint Communication to
the European Parliament and the Council, 2015). But alongside ASEAN, it also
important for the EU to strengthen its participation in the major regional forums,
including the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) – which is an informal forum for dialogue
and cooperation on political, economic, and cultural issues between European and Asian
states, the European Commission, the ASEAN Secretariat, and the ARF (Council of the
European Union, 2012). The EU has also intensified its campaign to join the EAS.
However, it has so far failed to become a member of the EAS or of the ADMM Plus.
While, in fact, Asian countries recognise the contribution that the EU is making in
supporting regional integration, development, and democratisation, they also perceive
the body as lacking actorness and capabilities to carry out a coherent security policy for
the region (Kirchner, 2019). In particular, ASEAN members consider the EU as unable
to mitigate big powers’ competition (Yeo, 2016) or as tending to side with the United
States on sensitive security issues – including the SCS dispute. The EU’s Asia
engagement is also often perceived as too Sino-centric (Kirchner, 2019) and, in general
terms, the body is considered as having only limited geopolitical influence in comparison
to major powers in the region (Xuechen, 2018).
Notwithstanding the fact that multi-lateralism is a key priority of the EU’s strategy
since the release of “Towards a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, bilateralism has also par-
alleled multi-lateralism. The European Commission possesses, in fact, country-specific
agendas, and the EU supports Southeast Asian states in sectors ranging from education,
agriculture, democracy promotion, and human rights to trade-related assistance and efforts
to mitigate climate change. For instance, since 2013, the EU has been assistingMyanmar’s
democratic transition and the strengthening of its administrative capacities, policy
development, and legal reform. The combination of a multi-lateral and bilateral approach
is also evident in the economic realm, where the EU has pursued a mixed strategy on the
one hand aiming to create a bi-regional EU-ASEAN FTA, while on the other opting for
bilateral accords with individual Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and Vietnam.
The EU’s strategy towards Southeast Asia is also framed by a comprehensive
approach. Inter alia, the 2016 EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and the
2016 Bangkok Declaration on Promoting an ASEAN-EU Global Partnership for Shared
Strategic Goals reiterate the ideas and principles governing that comprehensive
approach. Respectively, the documents call on the EU to deepen economic diplomacy as
well as increase its security role and to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN in all areas
of mutual interest – especially targeting NTS domains. In the political and security
realms, the EU has scaled-up efforts to become a security partner for Southeast Asia. As
noted by the current HR, Federica Mogherini:
The economic face of Europe is the one that people are most familiar with [ . . . ]. But it is
striking how joint work on security has become the biggest area of growth in terms of our
expanding cooperation with Asian partners. (2018: 1)
Pennisi di Floristella 183
In recent years, the EU has particularly committed itself to closer cooperation in NTS
and has broadened its agenda in this realm – a fact that has even led to the suggestion that
the EU was announcing its own pivot to Southeast Asia (Islam, 2015). EU official
documents have, indeed, identified a rich and prolific menu of NTS issues, from counter-
terrorism to countering radicalisation, extremism, maritime security threats, and climate
change. Against this backdrop, a number of initiatives have been launched across various
NTS domains. For instance, the Border Management and Migration Programme has
aimed at supporting ASEAN in addressing challenges posed by human trafficking and
transnational crime. ASEAN and the EU are cooperating on antiterrorism through infor-
mation sharing via Interpol and Europol and are improving best practices for dealing
with violent extremism. Since 2013, a High-Level Dialogue on Maritime Security has
taken place regularly to explore maritime security, interagency coordination, the inves-
tigation of incidents, and port security. The EU also supports institutional capacities for
disaster response in ASEAN and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian
Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). In 2017, meanwhile, two new
EU–ASEAN programmes were launched to improve the sustainable use of peatlands
and haze mitigation in the ASEAN neighbourhood, as well as to conserve biodiversity
and sustainably manage protected areas there.
The rule of law is, as noted earlier, alsopart of theEU’s strategy.On this point, theEUhas
echoed concerns over rising tensions in the SCS and has expressed a specific interest in
guaranteeing the observance of the UNCLOS and issued a statement supporting the Inter-
national Court of Justice. However, the EU has hitherto only talked about helping local
countries build maritime capacities and has particularly promoted reconciliation and
confidence-building measures, calling for respect for the rule of law and the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes – without jeopardising its relations with China (Maier-Knapp, 2016).
EU strategy has also traditionally focused on ideas of democracy, human rights, and
the protection of fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Yeo (2016), the
EU has recently toned down its normative power approach, reflecting the idea that it
should be a model for Southeast Asian integration. And yet, it has increasingly recog-
nised ASEAN’s distinctive modus operandi, based on informality, minimal institutio-
nalisation, non-interference, respect for national sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of
disputes, and cooperation (European Parliament, 2017).
Finally, as part of its strategy, the EU is promoting regional integration and good
regional governance through development cooperation. The European Commission
Strategy for Asia 2007–2013 stated that encouraging integration and dialogue with
ASEAN is a key strategic priority for EU policy in Asia.
US Instruments of Cooperation
After the launch of its rebalancing policy, the United States made use of a wide range of
foreign policy instruments. These included the strengthening of diplomatic and political
relations, the enhancement of its regional presence and military position through multi-
lateral engagement and alliances, and a set of economic and development assistance
tools. On the diplomatic and political fronts, the United States engaged the region
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through a set of historical visits. It also supported the democratic transition process. In
Myanmar, it
announced the lifting of US sanctions by terminating an emergency order that deemed the
policies of the former military government a threat to US national security. (Brunnstrom,
2016: 1)
In 2014, following a coup in Thailand, the United States suspended military aid and
high-level contacts and encouraged the military government to restore democratic gov-
ernance and civil liberties.
The Obama administration was also particularly keen to demonstrate a multi-lateral
commitment and actively participated in regional frameworks such as the ADMM Plus,
the ARF, and the first Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, held in Manila. In 2009,
Obama inaugurated the US-ASEAN Summit and signed the TAC. In 2011, he became
the first US president to join the EAS. Significantly, under Obama, the United States
sought partnership with ASEAN as a means to cope with NTS issues. Among other
initiatives, cooperation in combating transnational crime was reinforced through US
engagement with the ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime while
the country has also assisted ASEAN transnational crime officials in fighting human
trafficking and harmonising human rights laws across Southeast Asia. At the Sunnylands
Summit, Obama also announced a new USD 1.97 million Aviation and Border Security
Program to increase the ability to utilise law enforcement information-sharing tools and
authorities already available to them as members of Interpol (ASEAN Secretariat,
2017b). In the spheres of climate change and disaster management, the United States was
particularly active. It assisted Cambodia and the Philippines on how to mitigate the
impacts of destabilising natural disasters and promoted environmentally sustainable
development strategies in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The United States
also provided more than USD 1 million in aid for the disaster monitoring and response
systems at the AHA Centre.
All of these instruments were complemented by bilateral tools. On the security
front, alliances remained at the heart of the rebalance. Among other initiatives, with the
ECDA, the United States supported the Philippines’ maritime capabilities. In financial
year 2015, the United States committed USD 119 million to maritime capacity-
building assistance and engaged in a variety of joint military exercises with South-
east Asian states – including the so-called Cobra Gold Exercise, held in Thailand. The
United States also supports training programmes for every Southeast Asian nation with
the exception of Myanmar. In 2015, the United States announced the Southeast Asia
Maritime Security Initiative in which USD 425 million in assistance was provided to
partners so as to help improve their maritime awareness. Washington has also devel-
oped a close defence relationship with Singapore and Indonesia. Since 2016, the
United States has also carried out freedom of navigation operations in the SCS fol-
lowing the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in favour of the Philippines and
denying China’s historic claims.
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On the economic front, the Obama administration demonstrated a preference, as
noted, for a multi-lateral approach. The Obama administration also embarked on an
important new initiative: US-ASEAN Connect, which was meant to create a network of
hubs across the region to better connect entrepreneurs, investors, and businesses with
each other across different areas: namely, business, energy, innovation, and policy.
Besides all this, the United States also cultivated partnerships with individual ASEAN
countries. Notably, it accelerated cooperation with Vietnam.
Additionally, the United States was an active supporter of development assis-
tance. Under the ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation
and Economic Integration, the US sustained programmes such as Connectivity
through Trade and Investment – with a total budget of USD 16.2 million (for the
years 2008–2013) – and the ASEAN-US Partnership for Good Governance, Equi-
table and Sustainable Development, and Security (ASEAN-US PROGRESS) –
funded to the tune of USD 14 million. The latter aimed at supporting the realisation
of the ASEAN Political Security Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Com-
munity Blueprints (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b). In 2009, the United States also
launched the Lower Mekong Initiative to reduce ASEAN socio-economic dis-
parities and to enhance cooperation in the areas of environment, health, education,
and infrastructure development in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam
(CMLV). In addition, the ASEAN Youth Volunteer Programme offered opportu-
nities for development for ASEAN youth. Meanwhile, the United States also
assisted individual ASEAN countries.
Up to now, the Trump administration seems to have favoured a more transactional
and unilateral approach, in line with the America First principle – especially in the
sphere of economic policy, as manifested in the country’s withdrawal from the TPP.
Security alliances and cooperation on defence are, as noted, at the forefront of Trump’s
Southeast Asia policy. Given this, Secretary of State Pompeo pledged USD 300 million
in new funding to reinforce security cooperation – especially to strengthen maritime
security, to develop humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping capabilities, and to
enhance programmes that counter transnational threats. On the other hand, according to
Narine (2018), Trump has shown little interest in engaging with other states through
diplomatic institutions.
Nonetheless, since 2018, there have been some signs of reassurance vis-a`-vis the
Southeast Asian region. Indeed, the United States has promised USD 10 million in
funding to support economic programmes, many of which fall under US-ASEAN
Connect. The United States has also unveiled a USD 113 million investment package
for technology, energy, and infrastructure. Moreover, the ARIA has authorised USD 1.5
billion annually over the next five years for a range of programmes – such as ones related
to counterterrorism, trade, human rights, and security – and for the development of a new
finance agency to counter China’s rise. However, these efforts are not yet paying off, and
according to a poll conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof
Ishak Institute, a Singapore think tank, under Trump’s presidency Southeast Asian states,
lacks confidence in Washington’s reliability as a strategic partner and as a provider of
regional security (Chandran, 2019).
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EU Instruments of Cooperation
It is clear that the EU is committed to a multi-lateral approach and views political
dialogue on issues of common concern as a pivotal instrument of its foreign policy
towards Southeast Asia. No wonder, then, that the EU has actively engaged the region in
military dialogue, exchanges, joint exercises, and cooperation in NTS domains. This it
has done especially through institutional networks such as ASEAN, the ARF, and
ASEM, promoting new dialogue mechanisms under these umbrella organisations – such
as the high-level dialogue on maritime security and the dialogue on human rights to
address specifically women’s rights, child protection, and the safety of migrant workers.
Economic cooperation has been furthered through the EU-ASEAN Dialogue, joint
seminars, and the EU-ASEAN Business Summit. Since the collapse of the EU-ASEAN
free trade talks in 2009, primarily due to concerns over Myanmar’s human rights record,
Brussels has pursued bilateral FTAs instead. These have been concluded with Singapore
(2013) and Vietnam (2015), while with Malaysia and Thailand negotiations are still
ongoing. The EU is also discussing a comprehensive economic partnership with Indo-
nesia. The EU is also an active supporter of ASEAN economic integration. To this end,
in mid-2016, the EU launched the Enhanced ASEAN Regional Integration Support by
the EU (ARISE Plus) programme, being the largest-ever EU-funded ASEAN one – with
it covering such areas as the single market, trade facilitation, reducing non-tariff barriers
to trade, intellectual property rights, civil aviation, and ASEAN statistics.
In the security field, the EU has specifically targeted instruments designed to tackle
NTS concerns. Since the adoption of the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action 2013–
2017, climate change, the environment, disaster management, and maritime security
have become vital new areas of cooperation. The EU is supporting activities to mitigate
climate change and assisting the AHA Centre as well as boosting the capacity of the
ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity. Inter alia, since 2012, the EU has supported the AHA
Centre through knowledge-sharing activities and exchanges. In 2014, a programme of
technical assistance – the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme – com-
menced with the goal of supporting the development of ASEAN capacities. In 2018, the
EU signed a EUR 10 million financing agreement designed to support ASEAN and the
AHA Centre in promoting the region’s resilience as well as encouraging regional and
international cooperation. In the arena of maritime security, the EU participated in 2016
in the first multi-national naval exercise hosted in Indonesia, named “Komodo,” to share
best practices and lessons learnt on peacekeeping and the navy. Nevertheless, regarding
other hard security issues – such as the SCS dispute – there is no evidence of coordinated
patrols nor of information and intelligence sharing either. The EU does not play a sig-
nificant role in the SCS vis-a`-vis ensuring freedom of navigation, and while it rhetori-
cally calls for using peaceful means and the rule of law, it nevertheless lacks concrete
instruments to back up these requests.
In terms of development co-operation, the EU is the largest provider of aid to the
region and the biggest donor to the ASEAN Secretariat. Between 1996 and 2013, the
European Commission provided ASEAN nations with almost EUR 200 million as part of
its development assistance programme (Maier-Knapp and Dosch, 2017). The EU has
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also funded a number of programmes in supporting the realisation of the three pillars
(security, economic, and sociocultural) of the ASEAN Community, such as the ASEAN
Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS, 2003–2010) and the Regional
EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) – which has been ongoing since 2011. It has
also targeted non-economic issues such as disaster preparedness and management,
energy security, and human rights, crafting ASEAN Regional Integration Support from
the EU (ARISE, 2013–2016) to further promote ASEAN economic integration.
The EU also provides ASEAN with technical assistance, capacity-building, lessons
learnt, and best practices. Currently, the Enhanced EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument
(E-READI) and ARISE Plus are the most important programmes of development
cooperation – with an overall budget of EUR 61 million. For 2014–2020, the EU has also
increased its development cooperation funding with a budget of more than EUR 170
million – more than doubling the amount for 2007–2013. This covers support for three
focal areas: connectivity through sustainable and inclusive economic integration; climate
change, the environment, and disaster management; and comprehensive dialogue
facilitation. In addition, the EU has pledged over EUR 3 billion to reduce poverty and
address development gaps in low-income ASEAN countries – paying special attention to
the CMLV and the Philippines for 2014–2020. Finally, it is worth noting that the EU
supports a set of social and cultural cooperation activities. Among others, the EU-SHARE
programme aims at raising the quality of higher education in Southeast Asia.
All in all, the EU is not fully able to apply comprehensive tools in Southeast Asia but
has nonetheless clearly managed to boost its activities in the economic, development,
and NTS arenas. This is also clearly reflected by the allocation of funds, which prioritise
the above-mentioned domains.
Comparing EU and US Approaches in and to Southeast Asia
The comparison of EU and US positions in and on Southeast Asia shows that Brussels
and Washington share some similar interests here. Examples are the preservation of
peace and stability; fostering trade and economic ties; and the promotion of democracy,
the rule of law, and universal human values. Under the Obama administration, other
commonalities could be identified in a shared vision based on the centrality of multi-
lateral institutions – as testified to, among other things, by the fact that both the EU and
the United States had appointed a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and
elevated their partnership with the group – and a greater emphasis on NTS challenges
and development cooperation. Notable in the latter regard were infrastructure and
connectivity as well as a shared interest in guaranteeing the unimpeded flow of trade
through the SCS.
Against this backdrop, in mid-2012, the EU’s first HR, Catherine Ashton, and Sec-
retary of State Clinton signed a Joint Statement promising transatlantic dialogue on
political, economic, security, and human rights issues. They committed to closer
cooperation with Asian partners in fighting transnational crime, terrorism, and addres-
sing cybersecurity issues – and especially in focusing on maritime cooperation. They
stressed the importance of cooperation in promoting democracy and human rights and in
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targeting development challenges in the Lower Mekong region. They noted the
importance of coordination to address climate change and the need to continue working
together so as to improve reciprocal market access for goods and services. All this
together suggested the prospect for greater transatlantic cooperation in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, a closer comparison of US and EU instruments and strategies suggests
that, despite some points of apparent convergence, the United States and the EU have
ultimately headed down significantly different paths – thereby casting doubt on future
prospects of transatlantic cooperation in this region. In terms of instruments, the United
States makes use of a wide range of tools – economic, development, security, and
political – that combine hard and soft power; bilateral and multi-lateral ones, including
alliances and support given to US allies, are also key instruments, as are ones to cope
with NTS challenges too. The EU also makes use of a variety of economic, political,
security, and development tools but lacks hard security foreign policy instruments. In
particular, the EU shows a preference for multi-lateral dialogue with the ASEAN region
as a whole and, unlike the United States, has prioritised support for ASEAN regional
integration.
The promotion of regional integration, particularly in the economic sphere but also in
a number of other areas besides, as well as support for the ASEAN Secretariat have
indeed been key elements of the EU’s toolbox in Southeast Asia. As confirmed by high-
level ASEAN decision-makers, “ASEAN could not exist without the substantial finan-
cial support provided by international donors and above all the EU” (Maier-Knapp and
Dosch, 2017: 132). In US foreign policy, meanwhile, multi-lateralism has not replaced
bilateralism, in particular US alliances and bilateral security partnerships. The current
Trump administration seems to promote bilateral cooperative instruments even more
than his predecessor did, as demonstrated by Trump’s firm opposition to multi-lateral
FTAs and his absence from multi-lateral gatherings.
EU and US strategies also seem to differ on several key points. First, although over
the last few years the EU has insisted on its capacity to implement a comprehensive
approach – one which has included previously neglected security issues – disparities in
its and the US’s approach are still huge given the fact that the former clearly lacks the
military security pillar as part of its strategy. From a security point of view, the EU pales
in comparison with the United States when it comes to hard security – as the former does
not possess a network of alliances and has only limited overseas power projection
capabilities. The EU in fact, unlike the United States, cannot offer the same security
guarantees and has therefore never been taken seriously as a security actor in a region
where traditional security threats remain of the greatest importance.
Second, US strategy – both under Obama and Trump – has been largely shaped by
China’s growing ascendance and by the need to contain its power projection in the
region. Conversely, the EU has traditionally not pursued any geopolitical agenda in
Southeast Asia (Conley et al., 2016). Thus, while the EU has attempted to simultane-
ously strengthen its engagement with regional institutions as well as to capture the
economic opportunities offered by China’s growth, the United States has sought to
strengthen ASEAN-led mechanisms primarily to maintain its own local influence and to
counterbalance China’s growing regional presence as well as its military rise. In this
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regard, various US initiatives – from Obama’s TPP to Trump’s new programmes seeking
to encourage infrastructure-financing, innovation, and transparency – have all sought to
counter China’s various attempts to project influence in the region, including through the
Belt and Road Initiative – an ambitious plan for long-term infrastructure development
involving some 60 countries.
By contrast, the fact that the United Kingdom, Germany, and other EU member states
signed onto the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank while the United States declined to
participate is a further indicator of transatlantic divergences and of the lack of a common
strategy vis-a`-vis China. That said, it is also true that over the last few years, the EU has
become increasingly uneasy about China’s assertiveness. For example, the latter’s
attempts to draw Central and Eastern European countries into its orbit through the so-
called “16þ1” platform has been perceived as a threat to European unity. Some have also
interpreted the recently launched EU Connectivity Strategy as an attempt to restrain
China. Nevertheless, up to the present, there are no signs of a joint EU-US approach to
the East Asian country.
Third, although the EU and the United States share the same interest in strengthening
maritime security and open sea lanes, EU engagement in this realm has not gone beyond
mere diplomatic statements. Unlike the United Staes, the EU has not played a significant
role in the maritime security of the SCS through exercises, interactions, and patrol
activities. Finally, another point of discrepancy – one which has only grown wider under
the Trump administration – pertains to NTS. It is clear that while the EU is heavily
investing in this domain and, among other things, prioritising climate change, envi-
ronmental protection, and disaster management, the Trump administration has shifted
the focus to issues of defence and counterterrorism while decreasing attention paid to
NTS issues. Above all, the president’s decision to pull out of the Paris Agreement on
combatting climate change suggests that Southeast Asian countries cannot rely too much
in this regard on cooperation with the United States.
In the economic realm, meanwhile, it is also apparent that the United States and the
EU have pursued independent trade policies. Transatlantic differences were already
evident under Obama, with the United States preferring to utilise the TPP regional
framework to enhance its trade and investment rules-based and regulatory framework,
while the EU was making use of a mixed strategy combining both bilateral and multi-
lateral trade deals (Cameron, 2016). Taking stock of the evolving trade policies under
Trump, it is also clear that the EU and US economic strategic agendas are divergent. The
current president is opting for a transactional approach centred on fair and reciprocal
trade and economic development led by the private sector under the America First
paradigm, but with a lack of a vision for a broader economic agenda for the region
(Searight, 2018).
Regarding human rights, democracy promotion, and support for a rules-based
regional order, the United States and the EU have both shown rather similar commit-
ments. For instance, they have supported Myanmar’s democratic progress by applying a
regime of sanctions and both then lifted these in response to recent processes of reform.
Nevertheless, the advent of Trump has paved the way for new transatlantic disparities in
this realm. Trump, in fact, has shown no interest in tying trade deals to human rights,
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unlike his EU counterparts or his predecessor. Furthermore, as noted by Cameron (2018),
even when the United States does make public statements about human rights, it now
tends not to follow up on them because of a desire to continue selling military equipment.
It also needs to be noted that, despite the current administration making efforts vis-a`-vis
democracy and human rights, “the governance pillar remains the only pillar that has not
been advanced in a high-level, stand-alone speech” (Parameswaran, 2019: 2).
Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that transatlantic cooperation has not materi-
alised in concrete form and that the 2012 Joint EU-US Statement has remained words on
paper only. Over the coming years, transatlantic cooperation in Southeast Asia is also
likely to be hampered by new emerging domestic constraints within both the EU and the
United States. Doubts remain about whether the EU can substantially contribute to
peace, stability, and development in Southeast Asia, due to crises within and beyond
European borders (Brexit, the rise of Euroscepticism, and the migration crisis to mention
but a few) that have rendered the Union increasingly unstable and more insecure.
Likewise, US-Southeast Asian relations are prone to a higher degree of uncertainty in
light of the North American country’s erratic policies.
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